Changes in Attitude, Changes in Latitude
Editoriale WSJ in occasione di viaggio Bush in India.
- Rafforzamento legami USA-India è il maggior
successo di Bush in Asia dopo il rafforzamento dell’alleanza militare con l’Australia. - Raddoppio commercio USA-India (altro articolo: +25%
l’anno) nonostante il permanere di protezionismo indiano verso investimenti
esteri e di timori USA per delocalizzazione. - India è stata per decenni più vicina a Russia che a
USA, - anni ’90 Clintion ha privilegiato Cina rispetto a
India. - L’abbandono del Trattato di Non Proliferazione Nucleare
vale la candela, - anche perché è dubbio che esso abbia fatto da
deterrente alla proliferazione (in Eu non sarebbe avvenuta perché UE ha posto
fine a rivalità militari). - deve liberalizzare di più. USA possono
contribuire con propri capitali allo sviluppo indiano, anche in agricoltura..
February 28, 2006
George Bush might be forgiven for basking in
the warmth during his inaugural trip to India this week. Given the chilly
reception he received in Beijing last November, New Delhi’s friendly embrace is
a welcome change. While the two democracies may stumble on an important nuclear
agreement this week, the broader relationship is still on a solidly upward
swing. That’s a change in attitude — based on shared values — to celebrate,
especially in such a troubled region.
Aside from the strengthening of the
U.S.-Australia alliance, the deepening of U.S.-Indian relations may well
be the Bush administration’s most underreported success in Asia. The Texan
and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh share a good working relationship. Trade
between the two nations doubled last year, despite India’s still-high foreign
investment barriers on one side, and U.S. congressional griping about the
"outsourcing" of American jobs to India, on the other side. Much of
the economic, business and energy dialogues between the two nations are now
"institutionalized." And as President Bush put it last week, "our
interests and values are bringing us closer together."
Those with long memories will understand what
an achievement that represents. Under Nehru’s leadership during the Cold
War, India leaned towards the Soviets. After the Evil Empire disintegrated,
India’s Communists remained a powerful constituency domestically, thwarting
closer U.S. ties. In the 1990s, the Clinton administration courted India but
placed more emphasis on its relationship with China. Contrast that to
today, when Mr. Singh and Mr. Bush are toasting each other over state dinners.
Given that, it’s a little misleading to place
the success or failure of Mr. Bush’s visit, which kicks off on Wednesday,
solely on one issue. But this is a particularly sticky one, and the Americans
are partly to blame here. The administration played up the chances of inking a
transformational nuclear agreement this week that would allow America to sell
civil technology to India, while requiring India to place its civilian nuclear
facilities under international monitoring and continue a nuclear testing
moratorium.
Now, the deal looks like it’s stalled, and
even if it wasn’t, U.S. Democrats are gearing up for a fight. Unhelpfully,
U.S. Ambassador to India David Mulford suggested tying the nuclear deal to
cooperation on referring Iran to the U.N. Security Council last month, stirring
a domestic outcry. The incident didn’t help Mr. Singh, who is struggling to
control noisy anti-U.S. constituencies — many of which may grab headlines in
rowdy protests this week.
That’s too bad, as George Melloan explains in
a nearby column, because the nuclear pact makes good sense. No, India never
signed up to the United Nations’ 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty on Nuclear
Weapons. But while that agreement, which requires non-nuclear signatories
to renounce the bomb and nuclear nations to share technologies, has helped
monitor nuclear developments, it’s arguable whether or not it acted as an
effective deterrent. There are a number of reasons countries decided not to
acquire nukes; for example, how the creation of the European Union ended
military rivalries in Western Europe. More broadly, there’s a vast
difference between a threatening regime like Iran’s possessing nukes as
compared to a friendly, democratic India.
In the absence of a nuclear deal, there’s
still plenty for Mr. Bush and Mr. Singh to make headway on. Dropping trade
barriers would help. New Delhi still has only radically liberalized a few
sectors, mostly in industries that wouldn’t affect too many jobs at home.
That’s held back economic growth and stifled foreign investment. Protectionism
also hasn’t helped India deal with its main public policy problem: how to
modernize its agricultural sector and get those workers into service areas. Mr.
Bush and American companies could help there, too.
The changes in U.S.-India relations are
impressive when contrasted to how U.S.-China relations have cooled in recent
months. But we’d bet this isn’t a temporary phenomenon. Changes in attitude
based on democratic values are hard to break, whereas financial fervor is a
fickle friend.