Wladimir van Wilgenburg
– I curdi siriani sono una minoranza non araba del 10%, abitante in tre enclave curde delle province di Aleppo e Hasakah, vicine al confine con la Turchia.
o Dal 2011 il Syrian Kurdish Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat (PYD – Partito Curdo Siriano di Unione Democratica),
[1]
ha esteso il suo controllo ad ampie porzioni di queste enclave tramite le sue Unità di Difesa del Popolo – YPG, Yekineyen Parastina Gel.
o Il PYD ha una base di sostegno tradizionale nelle aree curde di Aleppo, sostegno che sta crescendo. I tentativi turchi di sradicare fisicamente il PYD potrebbero essere problematici e provocare una guerra civile curdo-araba.
– Guerra civile preannunciata dagli scontri armati per il controllo delle aree curde, iniziati a fine ottobre in Siria, tra le milizie curde e quelle dei gruppi islamisti di opposizione (a Ras al-Ayn (in curdo Serekaniye) vicino al confine turco,
o guerra civile che renderebbe meno facile all’Esercito Libero Siriano (ELS), e agli altri gruppi affiliati, conquistare le aree strategiche nel Nord del paese, come la provincia petrolifera di Hasakah e Aleppo.
– Gli scontri per il controllo delle aree curde sono avvenuti dopo che il presidente del Curdistan iracheno, Massoud Barzani, non è riuscito ad impedire che il PYD estendesse la propria influenza in Siria.
o Per evitare una guerra civile intercurda, o tra i curdi e l’opposizione siriana, destabilizzante per il Kurdistan iracheno, Barzani promosse l’accordo di luglio tra il PYD e il Consiglio Nazionale Curdo siriano (debole coalizione di oltre 11 partiti e gruppi giovanili sostenuti da Barzani).
– La Turchia appare più preoccupata di contrastare la crescente influenza del PYD in Siria e il controllo del PKK nelle aree curde autonome che non di aiutare i ribelli siriani a rovesciare il regime di Assad.
– Le nuove recenti tensioni potrebbero rafforzare il governo Assad, e fanno pensare che la Turchia stia facilitando l’entrata dei ribelli siriani in Siria per impedire l’influenza di gruppi curdi legati al PKK.
– Il PYD, che si dice neutrale, ha negoziato sia con i ribelli che con il governo siriano per il controllo di un maggior numero di aree curde, negoziato che ha ridotto gli scontri sia con il regime che con i ribelli, fino al 26 di ottobre,
o quando si sono avuti i primi gravi scontri armati, ad Aleppo e dintorni, tra il PYD e la Brigata d’assalto del Nord, non affiliata all’ELS, forte di 1200 uomini, che controlla la via di transito verso la Turchia.
o Il PKK ha minacciato di intervenire in appoggio al PYD. Il PYD ha accusato altri gruppi curdi rivali di aver preso parte agli incidenti appogiati dalla Turchia. L’YPG ha dichiarato sette dei soldati 19 morti sarebbero curdi del Partito della Libertà di Mustafa Cummaa, critico verso il PKK.
o Per il vice-comandante dell’ELS, Malik al-Kurdi, il conflitto sarebbe stato causato da gruppi curdi che spingono l’ELS a combattere contro il PYD.
o Gli scontri sono scoppiati dopo che gruppi islamisti siriani sono entrati nei distretti controllati dal PYD, rompendo la tregua in base alla quale ELS e altri gruppi islamisti non dovevano entrare in queste aree. La tregua era stata concordata da YPG e ELS perché consapevoli che il conflitto tra di essi può avvantaggiare Assad; le due parti hanno negoziato il controllo di checkpoint e la liberazione di detenuti. (Today’s Zaman, 31 ottobre). Il 1° novembre anunciato l’accordo ELS-PYD.
– Sembra che il regime Assad abbia cercato di impedire questo accordo, bombardando i distretti curdi di Aleppo il 4 novembre. Appena calate le tensioni tra PYD e ELS, il 9 novembre la Brigata islamista Ghuraba’a al-Sham e il Fronte al-Nusra sono entrati nella città curda di Ras al-Ayn, dalla Turchia. Essendo l’area abitata da curdi ed arabi, i curdi siriani hanno temuto che la guerra si estendesse alla provincia di Hasaka.
o In un primo momento non si sono avuti scontri tra islamisti e unità YPG, che si sono ritirate nei distretti curdi, e l’ELS nella parti arabe di Ras al-Ayn; ma i media legati ai curdi hanno accusato la Turchia di cercare di coinvolgere i curdi nella guerra civile.
o l’11 novembre l’area di Ras al-Ayn è stata bombardata da caccia, artiglieria ed elicotteri del regime siriano per tre giorni, decine le vittime tra civili e ribelli; la maggior parte degli abitanti sono fuggiti verso Turchia o la città di Derbisiyye, controllata dai curdi.
o Il 14 novembre la Turchia ha ammassato le sue truppe al confine assieme ad unità dell’ELS, dichiarando che il bombardamento siriano sulle città turche di confine costituiva una minaccia contro di essa e che avrebbe abbattuto i caccia siriani se attraversavano il confine.
– Il PYD teme che, in base all’Accordo di Adana,[2] la crisi dei rifugiati seguita al bombardamento possa essere considerata dalla Turchia una minaccia alla “sicurezza e stabilità della Turchia”, giustificazione legale per intervenire in Siria:potrebbe accadere che guerriglieri dell’ELS entrino nel Kurdistan (siriano) su carri armati turchi.
– Anche gli scontri del 19 novembre tra gruppi islamisti e PYD fanno pensare ad coinvolgimento turco, i feriti islamisti sono stati trasportati in ospedali turchi; il 20 gli islamisti hanno ricevuto rinforzi dal confine turco, e il PYD da altre città curde siriane.
– È probabile che si verifichino nuovi scontri perché i gruppi islamisti siriani intendono espandere le loro operazioni fuori dal Ras al-Ayn ad altre città curde, come Amude, Qamishli e Derik. Secondo l’ex presidente del Consiglio Nazionale Siriano, è improbabile che, senza il consenso occidentale, la Turchia utilizzi l’espansione del conflitto per creare un corridoio umanitario nel Nord della Siria. Essa potrebbe però facilitare il rifornimento di armi all’ELS contro il PYD.
– Diplomatici occidentali temono che la Turchia appoggi l’ELS per impedire la creazione di una regione autonoma curda in Siria;
o secondo AT la Turchia non è contraria all’autonomia curda in Siria o Irak, avendo buone relazioni con i partiti nazionalisti curdi siriani del Congresso Nazionale Curdo; la Turchia si oppone però ad una maggiore influenza del PYD e del PKK in Siria, posizione appoggiata pienamente dagli USA. La segretaria di Stato americana, Clinton: … la Siria non deve divenire un rifugio per i terroristi del PKK, né ora né dopo la fine del regime di Assad.
– La Turchia teme che gli scontri tra ribelli siriani e PYD servano ad accrescere il sostegno a quest’ultimo nelle comunità curde,
o come pure che impediscano ad altri gruppi curdi di rifiutare il proprio sostegno al PYD contro gli arabi,
tenendo conto che una partedegli arabi che stanno combattendo contro il PYD sono coloni arabi portati nell’area dal governo siriano per la sua politica di arabizzazione.
[1] Il PYD è affiliato al PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan – Partito dei Lavoratori del Kurdistan), ma nega i legami con esso per non essere posto sulla lista internazionale dei terroristi.
[2] Siria e Turchia giunsero sull’orlo del conflitto armato quando la Turchia minacciò di intervenire militarmente se la Siria continuava a riparare Öcalan a Damasco. Dopo la sua espulsione da Damasco e la sua cattura in Kenya, il 22 ottobre 1998 venne firmato l’Accordo di Adana. L’articolo 1 dell’Accordo recita: “La Syria, sulla base del principio di reciprocità, non permetterà nessuna attività proveniente dal proprio territorio volta a minare la sicurezza e la stabilità della Turchia.”
L’art. 1 continua: “la Siria non permetterà sul proprio territorio il rifornimento di armi, materiale logistico e sostegno finanziario e attività di propaganda del PKK.”
New Arab-Kurdish front could strengthen Assad
– Clashes between Kurdish militias and armed Syrian opposition groups in Aleppo starting at the end of October in Ras al-Ayn near the Turkish border have raised the specter of a possible Arab-Kurdish civil war in Syria. An Arab-Kurdish civil war would weaken the efforts of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and non-FSA affiliated groups to take over strategic areas in northern Syria such as oil-rich Hasakah province and Aleppo.
– Any fighting between the Syrian armed opposition and Kurdish militias trying to establish their authority in Kurdish-dominated areas could strengthen the resolve of the government led by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
– Moreover, the fighting could indicate that Turkey is facilitating the entry of Syrian armed rebels into Syria to prevent the influence of Kurdish groups affiliated to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
– Even as Syrian insurgents fighting in the streets of Damascus call for President Bashar al-Assad to flee the country while he still can, there is the possibility that a new front may open in the struggle for Syria as Kurdish nationalists increasingly come into conflict with Islamist militias fighting the Assad regime.
– Serious clashes erupted on November 19 between Islamist groups and fighters of the Syrian Kurdish Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat (PYD – Democratic Union[e] Party) in the border town of Ras al-Ayn (Kurdish: Serekaniye), killing at least 18 combatants. This is the second time serious fighting has erupted between Islamist groups fighting Assad and combatants of the PYD, which is affiliated to the larger Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK – Kurdistan Workers Party) but publically denies such ties for fear they could lead to placement of the PYD on international terrorist lists.
– While Turkey is worried about the increasing influence of the PYD, the PKK is concerned by Turkish support to the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and claims that Turkey is hatching plans to destroy PYD influence in Syria.
– The Syrian Kurds are a non-Arab minority that comprise up to 10% of the population and are spread over three Kurdish-dominated enclaves in the provinces of Aleppo and Hasakah. [1] These areas are close to the Turkish border, and since 2011 the PYD has managed to extend its control over large parts of these enclaves through its Yekineyen Parastina Gel (YPG – People’s Defense Units) to the despair of Turkey.
– The recent clashes came after Massoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, failed in his efforts to prevent PYD influence from spreading in Syria. Barzani supported an agreement in July between Syria’s Kurdish National Council (KNC) – a weak coalition of more than 11 political parties and youth groups supported by Barzani – and the PYD in order to prevent a Kurdish civil war.
– For Barzani, Kurdish infighting, or Kurdish fights with the Syrian armed opposition could destabilize security in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, and he has warned against this publically.
– These tensions indicate that a new battlefront near the Turkish border could be opened between anti-Assad Islamist fighters and combatants associated with the PKK, slowing down rebel progress against Damascus and Aleppo.
– The FSA and Arab Islamist groups are perceived to be close to the interests of the Turkish state by the PYD, while the FSA and other armed groups have accused the PYD of working with the Assad government.
– The PYD claims to be neutral and has made unofficial deals with both Syrian rebels and the government to take control of more Kurdish areas. As a result, there have been minor clashes with both security forces of the regime and Syrian rebels.
– Major clashes erupted for the first time on October 26 in the Kurdish al-Ashrafiya neighborhood of Aleppo, where dozens were killed and hundreds kidnapped by both sides. Clashes also occurred in Aleppo and near the Syrian towns of Efrin and Azzaz, between the PYD and the 1,200 strong non-FSA affiliated Northern Storm Brigade, which controls the vital crossing from Aleppo province into Turkey. The PKK based in the Qandil Mountains near the Iraqi-Turkish border also threatened to support its PYD affiliate.
– Despite media reports that the clashes could lead to sectarian conflict between Kurds and Arabs, the PYD blamed other rival Kurdish groups of being involved in the incident with the support of Turkey.
– The YPG stated that, of the 19 FSA combatants killed in the clashes, seven were Kurds affiliated to Mustafa Cummaa’s Freedom Party, which has been the most critical of the PKK. Deputy FSA commander Malik al-Kurdi claimed the conflict was caused by Kurdish groups pushing the FSA to fight with the PYD.
– The increasing success of the FSA and other armed Islamist groups has led to the movement’s spread to Kurdish-dominated areas in northern Syria. Thus clashes broke out after Syrian Islamist groups entered PYD-controlled districts, breaking the alleged cold truce between the two groups that said the FSA or other armed Islamist groups would not enter PYD-controlled areas. The PYD was not willing to help the FSA to fight Assad, but was also disinclined to fight the FSA unless the Syrian insurgents entered PYD-controlled areas.
– Both the FSA and the YPG realized that fighting between them could benefit the Assad regime (Today’s Zaman, October 31). "We and the Free Syrian Army are one side, we are not on opposite sides," PYD-official Sinem Muhammad told Jamestown [2].
– The two sides therefore engaged in negotiations over the control of checkpoints and the handover of detainees. On November 1, the FSA announced that it had reached an agreement with the PYD stating that both sides aimed to topple the Assad-regime and would hand over detainees. The PYD’s foreign representative Alan Semo told Jamestown that the initial agreement was only meant to stop further fighting while other demands were still negotiated. [3]
– One of the primary demands impeding the progress of negotiations was the fate of YPG Commander Nujin Deriki (aka Shaha Ali Abdo), who was captured on October 26. On November 2, the YPG claimed that she had been tortured to death, which led to demonstrations and further tensions. The FSA subsequently announced she was still alive and was supposed to be released.
– It seemed that the Syrian regime tried to prevent the FSA and PYD from reaching agreement by shelling the Kurdish districts of Aleppo on November 4, killing three people. On November 10, the FSA released the YPG commander, leading to diminished tensions between the groups in Aleppo.
– Just as tensions between the PYD and the FSA were dying down, the Islamist Ghuraba’a al-Sham (Strangers of Greater Syria) Brigade and al-Nusra Front entered the Kurdish city of Ras al-Ayn on November 9 from the Turkish town of Ceylanpinar and the nearby village of Tel Halaf. The area is populated by Kurds and Arabs, leading to fears among Syrian Kurds that the war would spread to Hasaka province.
– Initially, those fears proved unfounded as this did not lead to fighting between the Islamists and the Kurdish YPG units, with the YPG retreating to Kurdish districts of the town and the FSA controlling Arab parts of Ras al-Ayn. However, it did lead to accusations from PYD-affiliated media, such as the Kurdish news agency Firat News, that Turkey was behind the entry of armed groups into Ras al-Ayn, trying to involve Kurds in the civil war. A PYD-affiliated group claimed in a statement that they would not allow armed groups into Kurdish districts.
– On November 11, the Ras al-Ayn area was bombed by fighter jets, artillery and helicopters, leading to the death of dozens of civilians and insurgents. The bombing lasted for three days, with most inhabitants fleeing the city for Turkey or the Kurdish-controlled town of Derbisiyye.
After the Islamists moved into Ras al-Ayn, the YPG forced remaining Syrian government security elements from Derik (al-Malikiyah), Amude, Derbisiye and Tel Amir, fearing the arrival of Syrian insurgents and the spread of fighting. The YPG indicated it did not want to give "the regime [or] the FSA any excuse to come here. We don’t need anyone to protect us".
– Turkey amassed its troops near the border and condemned the Syrian military operations that led to the death of civilians in Ras al-Ayn. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stated that the Syrian air bombardment of Turkish border towns was a clear threat to Turkey, adding that Turkey would shoot down Syrian fighter jets if they cross the border.
– The PYD’s foreign representative, Alan Semo, told Jamestown that the PYD is worried that under the Adana Agreement, Turkey could characterize the ensuing refugee crisis as a threat to the "security and stability of Turkey," leading to a legal path for Turkish intervention in Syria. "You might see the FSA on Turkish tanks coming into Kurdistan. This scenario can happen," he said. [4]
– Reports emerged on November 14 that Turkish tanks were amassing on the border of Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) alongside FSA units. Others have suggested that Western diplomats fear Turkey is supporting the FSA to prevent an autonomous Kurdish region in Syria. In reality, Turkey is not against Kurdish autonomy in Syria (or in Iraq) since it has good relations with the Syrian Kurdish nationalist parties of the Kurdish National Congress, but it does oppose the increasing influence of the PYD and the PKK in Syria.
– The United States fully supports the Turkish position of opposing any PKK presence in Syria. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed her support at a joint news conference in Istanbul with her Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu, saying, "We share Turkey’s determination that Syria must not become a haven for PKK terrorists whether now or after the departure of the Assad regime."
– The clashes that erupted between the armed Islamist groups and the PYD on November 19 further raised PYD suspicions of Turkish involvement. The fact that wounded Islamist fighters were transported to Turkish hospitals showed a certain degree of Turkish support. A temporary truce was made on November 19 to hand over wounded and dead bodies. But on November 20, fighting resumed again between the Islamist groups receiving reinforcements from the Turkish border and the PYD receiving reinforcements from other Kurdish cities in Syria. The fighting stopped after a ceasefire agreement between the two sides on November 23.
– Kurdish political parties have argued that the armed Syrian opposition should fight Assad in Damascus or Aleppo, not in Kurdish areas. It is likely that in the current situation more clashes could erupt due to the fact that armed Syrian Islamist groups expressed their intention to expand their operations outside of Ras al-Ayn to other Kurdish-dominated cities such as Amude, Qamishli and Derik.
– However, according to Abdul Basit Sieda, former head of the Syrian National Council (SNC), it is unlikely that Turkey would use this expansion of the conflict to establish a humanitarian corridor in northern Syria without support from the West: "If Turkey wants to move, they need the international community to accept it." [5]
– Turkey could, however, facilitate the supply of reinforcements and weapons for the FSA to attack the PYD. Moreover, it could try to use Western support to decrease PKK influence in Syria and try to pressure the United States or European Union[e] to put the PYD on the terrorist list.
– The problem for Turkey is that fighting between the PYD and Syrian rebels could increase PYD support in Kurdish communities and make it more difficult for other Kurdish groups not to support the group against the Arabs,
o especially as some of those fighting against the PYD are allegedly former Arab settlers who were brought to the area by the Syrian government as part of its "Arab belt" policies.
– The PYD already has a traditional support base around the Kurdish areas of Aleppo and is increasing its support. Therefore, Turkish attempts to physically eradicate the PYD could prove to be troublesome and lead to an Ar
– ab-Kurdish civil war.
– It seems that Turkey is focused on preventing the PKK from controlling autonomous Kurdish areas instead of supporting the insurgency in Syria to overthrow the Assad government. Continued fighting between Kurds and Arabs in the Hasakah province could weaken Syrian rebel advances against Assad and strengthen the current weak position of the Assad government.
1. Jordi Tejel, "Syria’s Kurds: Troubled Past, Uncertain Future," Carnegie Middle East Center, October 16, 2012.
2. Author’s interview with Sinem Mohammed, head of the PYD-affiliated People’s Council of West-Kurdistan (PCWK).
3. Author’s interview with PYD foreign representative Alan Semo, November 11-15, 2012.
4. Foreign Minister Davutoglu There is not even a minute to lose, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
5. Author’s interview with Abdul Basit Sieda, November 19, 2012.
(This article first appeared in The Jamestown Foundation. Used with permission.)
Today’s Zaman 120409
Adana agreement paves legal path for Turkish intervention in Syria
– Using the provisions of the Adana agreement, signed between Turkey and Syria on Oct. 20, 1998, Turkey has the ability to classify the violent crackdown on the opposition by the Bashar al-Assad government and the ensuing refugee crisis as a threat to the “security and stability of Turkey.”
– Article 1 of the Adana agreement states that “Syria, on the basis of the principle of reciprocity, will not permit any activity that emanates from its territory aimed at jeopardizing the security and stability of Turkey.” The bloody crackdown on the opposition that has entered its second year has destabilized the country, with over 1 million Syrians internally displaced and nearly 25,000 Syrian refugees having fled to Turkey. The United Nations reports say that more than 9,000 civilians have been killed in the Syrian government’s yearlong assault on protesters opposed to Assad.
– As stability in Syria is long gone and the number of refugees crossing the border over to the Turkish side has climbed rapidly, this provision gives Turkey the right to take the necessary measures to contain the threat.
– The Adana agreement also raises the issue of terrorism, especially the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) threat leveled against Turkey from Syrian soil. Article 1 continues, saying, “Syria will not allow the supply of weapons, logistical material and financial support to and the propaganda activities of the PKK on its territory.”
But, Syria — which allowed Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK who is now imprisoned on the island of İmralı, to take shelter and direct the terrorist organization from within its borders for several years until 1998, the year when Syria had to deport Öcalan because of pressure from Turkey — seems inclined to play the PKK card against Turkey since its neighbor to the north has taken a stern attitude and criticized Damascus when it chose to crush the demonstrations calling for reforms by firing at the protestors. According to the second article of the agreement, “Syria has recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization and banned all activities of the PKK and its affiliated organizations in its territories.” However, reports indicate that the Syrian regime started supplying arms to the PKK and its affiliate organizations in recent months.
The third article of the agreement states that Syria will not allow the PKK to establish camps and other facilities for training and shelter, or undertake commercial activities in its territories. The fourth article continues, “Syria will not allow PKK members to use Syria for transit to third countries.”
The last article of the agreement states, “Syria will take all necessary measures to prevent the head of the PKK terrorist organization from entering Syrian territory and will instruct its authorities at border points to that effect.”
According to intelligence estimates shared with Today’s Zaman, Syria has given the PKK free rein in the north, and Syrian security services have even assassinated moderate Kurdish politicians to pave the way for the PKK to reassert itself in Syria’s Kurdish regions.
Today’s Zaman has also obtained the transcript of the meeting during which the agreement was signed, which include a series of pledges made by the Syrian government of the time. According to these minutes, Syria promised that “Öcalan and the PKK elements abroad will definitely not be permitted to enter Syria, and the PKK camps will be prevented from becoming active.”
Relations between Turkey and Syria were thorny before 1998. The two countries were at the brink of war when Turkey threatened military action if Syria continued to shelter Öcalan in Damascus, his longtime safe haven. Besides Syria’s support for the PKK, which has been recognized as a terrorist organization by NATO, the EU and many other countries, the other contentious issues between Syria and Turkey included Syria’s claims over Hatay and water disputes resulting from the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP).
The signing of the Adana agreement marked a turning point in the relations between the two countries. The agreement established cooperation against the PKK terrorist organization, and relations subsequently flourished in all aspects, including politics, economics, security and culture, until the recent developments in Syria.
The Adana agreement was concluded after Iranian Foreign Minister Kemal Harrazi and Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa intervened on behalf of their presidents. The Turkish and Syrian delegations met in Adana on Oct. 19-20, 1998, under the auspices of these mediators to sign an agreement on cooperation against terrorism.