Le agenzie di intelligence Usa non vedono passi avanti dell’Iran per bomba atomica/+WSJ, Gli USA rafforzano le difese contro l’Ira

Nyt     120225

Le agenzie di intelligence Usa non vedono passi avanti dell’Iran per la costruzione di una bomba atomica

JAMES RISEN e MARK MAZZETTI

–   Benché i servizi americani, israeliani ed europei concordino che l’Iran ha un programma di arricchimento dell’uranio (il passo più difficile per la costruzione dell’arma atomica) e ha sviluppato infrastrutture necessarie per divenire una potenza nucleare, e nonostante IAEA, l’agenzia per il nucleare dell’ONU, abbia dichiarato che l’Iran ha accelerato questo programma con un arricchimento che andrebbe oltre il livello di purezza necessario per uso civile,

o   per gli analisti di 16 servizi segreti americani non c’è alcuna prova che l’Iran abbia deciso di costruire una bomba atomica (ora come già nel 2007, conclusione riconfermata nel 2010).

o   L’Iran avrebbe abbandonato nel 2003 il programma per la costruzione di armi atomiche; ora deve ancora decidere se riprenderlo.

–   Secondo alcuni analisti e alcuni funzionari dei servizi l’arricchimento dell’uranio servirebbe all’Iran per accrescere la propria influenza nella regione, creando una “ambiguità strategica”, cioè dubbi sulle sue ambizioni nucleari.

Quando nel 2007 i servizi americani valutarono che l’Iran aveva abbandonato il programma per la bomba atomica, funzionari europei e israeliani pensarono che questa valutazione rientrasse nel tentativo da parte della CIA di evitare un intervento americano contro l’Iran.
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Wsj     120225

Gli USA rafforzano le difese contro l’Iran – Il Pentagono progetta nuove misure di mare e di terra per contrastare qualsiasi tentativo di chiudere l’ingresso petrolifero del Golfo

ADAM ENTOUS e JULIAN E. BARNES

–   Mentre Casa Bianca e rappresentanti della Difesa abbassano i toni bellici, giungono segnali di preparazione concreta ad un possibile conflitto con l’Iran

–   dal Pentagono che ha presentato al Congresso piani per colmare le lacune nella difesa americana in caso l’Iran chiuda mini lo Stretto di Hormuz (attraverso cui passa il 20% circa del comemrcio mondiale di petrolio):

o   rapida modifica dei sistemi di armi delle navi affinché possano essere utilizzati contro unità navali di attacco rapido e missili cruise lanciati dal terra.

o   installazione di nuovi dispositivi anti-mina e di sminamento e ampliare la sorveglianza nello stretto di Hormuz e nei suoi dintorni.

o   parteciperebbero all’intervento militare anche le squadre speciali americane stanziate negli Emirati.

–   Gli Usa temono che Israele decida di attaccare l’Iran il prossimo autunno, con conseguente risposta iraniana e necessità di intervento militare da parte degli Usa.

–   La richiesta finanziaria è di $100MN, e servirebbe ad aggiornare le navi pattuglia e droni, ed aumentare il numero di armi di piccolo calibro sulle navi,

o   e si aggiunge ai $200mn. già accordati (senza suonare fanfare) la scorsa estate al Comando centrale per riqualificazioni varie, compreso un sistema di difesa contro i siluri, armi aeree antimina, nuove armi cibernetiche.

o   I droni sottomarini SeaFox, sono lanciati da un elicottero e usati per far saltare le mine

Nyt      120225
February 24, 2012

U.S. Agencies See No Move by Iran to Build a Bomb

By JAMES RISEN and MARK MAZZETTI

–   WASHINGTON — Even as the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog said in a new report Friday that Iran had accelerated its uranium enrichment program, American intelligence analysts continue to believe that there is no hard evidence that Iran has decided to build a nuclear bomb.

–   Recent assessments by American spy agencies are broadly consistent with a 2007 intelligence finding that concluded that Iran had abandoned its nuclear weapons program years earlier, according to current and former American officials. The officials said that assessment was largely reaffirmed in a 2010 National Intelligence Estimate, and that it remains the consensus view of America’s 16 intelligence agencies.

–   At the center of the debate is the murky question of the ultimate ambitions of the leaders in Tehran. There is no dispute among American, Israeli and European intelligence officials that Iran has been enriching nuclear fuel and developing some necessary infrastructure to become a nuclear power.

–   But the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies believe that Iran has yet to decide whether to resume a parallel program to design a nuclear warhead — a program they believe was essentially halted in 2003 and which would be necessary for Iran to build a nuclear bomb. Iranian officials maintain that their nuclear program is for civilian purposes.

–   In Senate testimony on Jan. 31, James R. Clapper Jr., the director of national intelligence, stated explicitly that American officials believe that Iran is preserving its options for a nuclear weapon, but said there was no evidence that it had made a decision on making a concerted push to build a weapon. David H. Petraeus, the C.I.A. director, concurred with that view at the same hearing. Other senior United States officials, including Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta and Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have made similar statements in recent television appearances.

“They are certainly moving on that path, but we don’t believe they have actually made the decision to go ahead with a nuclear weapon,” Mr. Clapper told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

–   Critics of the American assessment in Jerusalem and some European capitals point out that Iran has made great strides in the most difficult step toward building a nuclear weapon, enriching uranium. That has also been the conclusion of a series of reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspectors, who on Friday presented new evidence that the Iranians have begun enriching uranium in an underground facility.

–   Once Iran takes further steps to actually enrich weapons grade fuel — a feat that the United States does not believe Iran has yet accomplished — the critics believe that it would be relatively easy for Iran to engineer a warhead and then have a bomb in short order. They also criticize the C.I.A. for being overly cautious in its assessments of Iran, suggesting that it is perhaps overcompensating for its faulty intelligence assessments in 2002 about Iraq’s purported weapons programs, which turned out not to exist. In addition, Israeli officials have challenged the very premise of the 2007 intelligence assessment, saying they do not believe that Iran ever fully halted its work on a weapons program.

–   Yet some intelligence officials and outside analysts believe there is another possible explanation for Iran’s enrichment activity, besides a headlong race to build a bomb as quickly as possible. They say that Iran could be seeking to enhance its influence in the region by creating what some analysts call “strategic ambiguity.” Rather than building a bomb now, Iran may want to increase its power by sowing doubt among other nations about its nuclear ambitions. Some point to the examples of Pakistan and India, both of which had clandestine nuclear weapons programs for decades before they actually decided to build bombs and test their weapons in 1998.

“I think the Iranians want the capability, but not a stockpile,” said Kenneth C. Brill, a former United States ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency who also served as director of the intelligence community’s National Counterproliferation Center from 2005 until 2009. Added a former intelligence official: “The Indians were a screwdriver turn away from having a bomb for many years. The Iranians are not that close.”

To be sure, American analysts acknowledge that understanding the intentions of Iran’s leadership is extremely difficult, and that their assessments are based on limited information. David A. Kay, who was head of the C.I.A.’s team that searched for Iraq’s weapons programs after the United States invasion, was cautious about the quality of the intelligence underlying the current American assessment.

“They don’t have evidence that Iran has made a decision to build a bomb, and that reflects a real gap in the intelligence,” Mr. Kay said. “It’s true the evidence hasn’t changed very much” since 2007, he added. “But that reflects a lack of access and a lack of intelligence as much as anything.”

–   Divining the intentions of closed societies is one of the most difficult tasks for American intelligence analysts, and the C.I.A. for decades has had little success penetrating regimes like Iran and North Korea to learn how their leaders make decisions.

Amid the ugly aftermath of the botched Iraq intelligence assessments, American spy agencies in 2006 put new analytical procedures in place to avoid repeating the failures. Analysts now have access to raw information about the sources behind intelligence reports, to help better determine the credibility of the sources and prevent another episode like the one in which the C.I.A. based much of its conclusions about Iraq’s purported biological weapons on an Iraqi exile who turned out to be lying.

Analysts are also required to include in their reports more information about the chain of logic that has led them to their conclusions, and differing judgments are featured prominently in classified reports, rather than buried in footnotes.

–   When an unclassified summary of the 2007 intelligence estimate on Iran’s nuclear program was made public, stating that it had abandoned work on a bomb, it stunned the Bush administration and the world. It represented a sharp reversal from the intelligence community’s 2005 estimate, and drew criticism of the C.I.A. from European and Israeli officials, as well as conservative pundits. They argued that it was part of a larger effort by the C.I.A. to prevent American military action against Iran.

–   The report was so controversial that many outside analysts expected that the intelligence community would be forced to revise and repudiate the estimate after new evidence emerged about Iran’s program, notably from the United Nations’ inspectors. Yet analysts now say that while there has been mounting evidence of Iranian work on enrichment facilities, there has been far less clear evidence of a weapons program.

Still, Iran’s enrichment activities have raised suspicions, even among skeptics.

“What has been driving the discussion has been the enrichment activity,” said one former intelligence official. “That’s made everybody nervous. So the Iranians continue to contribute to the suspicions about what they are trying to do.”

–   Iran’s efforts to hide its nuclear facilities and to deceive the West about its activities have also intensified doubts. But some American analysts warn that such behavior is not necessarily proof of a weapons program. They say that one mistake the C.I.A. made before the war in Iraq was to assume that because Saddam Hussein resisted weapons inspections — acting as if he were hiding something — it meant that he had a weapons program.

As Mr. Kay explained, “The amount of evidence that you were willing to go with in 2002 is not the same evidence you are willing to accept today.”

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Wsj      120225

U.S. Bulks Up Iran Defenses – Pentagon Plans New Sea, Land Measures to Counter Any Attempt to Close Persian Gulf Oil Gateway

By ADAM ENTOUS and JULIAN E. BARNES

The Pentagon is beefing up U.S. sea- and land-based defenses in the Persian Gulf to counter any attempt by Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz.

–   The U.S. military has notified Congress of plans to preposition new mine-detection and clearing equipment and expand surveillance capabilities in and around the strait, according to defense officials briefed on the requests, including one submitted earlier this month.

–   The military also wants to quickly modify weapons systems on ships so they could be used against Iranian fast-attack boats, as well as shore-launched cruise missiles, the defense officials said.

–   The readiness push is spearheaded by the military’s Central Command, which oversees U.S. forces in the Gulf region, these officials said. It shows the extent to which war planners are taking tangible steps to prepare for a possible conflict with Iran, even as top White House and defense leaders try to tamp down talk of war and emphasize other options.

–   The changes put a spotlight on what officials have singled out as potential U.S. shortcomings in the event of conflict with Iran. The head of Central Command, Marine Gen. James Mattis, asked for the equipment upgrades after reviews by war planners last spring and fall exposed "gaps" in U.S. defense capabilities and military preparedness should Tehran close the Strait of Hormuz, officials said.

The Central Command reviews, in particular, have fueled concerns about the U.S. military’s ability to respond swiftly should Iran mine the strait, through which nearly 20% of the world’s traded oil passes.

"When the enemy shows more signs of capability, we ask what we can do to checkmate it," a U.S. military officer said. "They ought to know we take steps to make sure we are ready."

–   Tensions with Iran have soared as the U.S. and its allies have tightened sanctions against the country over its nuclear program. Tehran has responded by threatening to close the strait. Israel has accused Iran of being behind a recent series of botched bombing plots targeting Israeli diplomats, a charge Iran denies. Iranian officials, in turn, accuse Israel and the U.S. of conducting a secret campaign to assassinate scientists working on Iran’s nuclear program. The U.S. has denied the accusation, while Israel has declined to comment

–   New suspicions over Iran’s nuclear ambitions emerged Friday. In a report, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog, said Iran has increased its stockpile of uranium that is enriched beyond the purity level needed for civilian power reactors, and begun producing it under a mountain of rock and soil that some U.S. and Israeli officials say could be immune from attack.

Iran denies it is trying to build atomic weapons. It refused this week to allow U.N. inspectors access to suspected weapons sites, adding doubts to prospects for negotiations.

–   The U.S. is concerned that Israel—which believes that Tehran will soon be able to assemble a weapon, and that time is running short to stop the bid—may choose to strike Iran by this autumn to stymie such a program. That, defense officials worry, could provoke retaliation that could prompt U.S. military action to defend its troops and key allies, and to keep the Strait of Hormuz open.

U.S. sailors loading a lightweight torpedo.

 

–   The U.S. moves outline the potential shape of a conflict between Iran and the West: Iran could rapidly mine the strait and use heavily armed speedboats to attack or ram Western ships trying to clear the waterway. A successful Iranian attack on a U.S. warship could drag America into a larger conflict.

Central Command officials have told lawmakers they want the new mine-detection systems fielded before this fall, according to defense officials, underlining the urgency of preparedness.

In addition, U.S. special-operations teams stationed in the United Arab Emirates would take part in any military action in the strait should Iran attempt to close it, defense officials said. A military official said these forces have been working to train elite local forces in Gulf nations including the U.A.E., Bahrain and Kuwait, but added: "They would be used in the event of active operations."

–   According to defense officials, the Pentagon submitted a request to Congress on Feb. 7 on behalf of Central Command seeking to reallocate $100 million in defense funding to "bridge near-term capability gaps" in the Persian Gulf.

 
Strategic Gulf

U.S. forces are beefing up to face a possible threat from Iran. Among the upgrades the military has requested:

Torpedoes, torpedo defenses

    Decoys as countermeasures against torpedoes

    Equipment to detect opposing submarines

 
Fast-boat defense
 
    Upgrade MK38 Naval gun

    Test U.S. Javelin and Griffin missiles against fast boats

 

    Technologies to stop small vessels by entangling propellers

 
Mine defense

    Purchase additional SeaFox systems, remotely controlled antimine drones

Improve surveillance capability

    Retrofit existing infra-red and electro-optical surveillance systems for aircraft carriers

    Expand use of highresolution images to identify mines and other threats

    Purchase small Scan Eagle drone to improve surveillance of swarms of small boats

U.S. Department of Defense

–   The request has yet to be made public because it is still being studied by lawmakers, defense officials said. The money will be used to upgrade patrol craft and unmanned drones, as well as to add small arms on surface ships, the officials said.

Congress was told the money was urgently needed, according to an official briefed on the plan. "You can buy it and deploy it rapidly," the official said.

–   The new money comes on top of changes made last summer that provided Central Command with about $200 million for additional upgrades, some of which could be used in areas outside the Persian Gulf, defense officials said. The earlier request, which included money for a torpedo defense system, airborne antimine weapons and new cyber-weapons, was made by defense officials and backed without fanfare by Congress.

That request also included additional deployments of the SeaFox underwater drone, which is launched from a helicopter and uses a warhead to destroy mines. The system was deemed "an urgent operational need" by the U.S. Fifth Fleet, according to Navy officials.

–   The Pentagon and other U.S. agencies generally submit such reprogramming requests when they can’t wait until the next fiscal year. The Pentagon started making some adjustments as early as a year ago, but those didn’t require reprogramming.

–   The Pentagon told Congress that some of the new money would be used to modify existing weapons systems to be used against seaborne threats in the Persian Gulf and, specifically, the Strait of Hormuz.

–   Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard deploys some of the fastest naval vessels in the Persian Gulf. These craft may be small—only 17 meters, or 56 feet, long in some cases—but they can carry machine guns, torpedoes and the Iranian-made "Kowsar" antiship cruise missile. Some can reach speeds of 60 to 70 knots, according to U.S. military

–   Antitank weapons are being reconfigured for use against swarms of these boats that could threaten U.S. warships, the Pentagon told Congress. Similarly, rapid-fire machine guns designed to shoot down missiles are being tested for use against small boats.

Pentagon war planners believe the addition of smaller-caliber guns would quickly make U.S. destroyers, which were designed mainly to fight other large ships, more effective against the Iranian craft.

"We are using capabilities we already have in a different way," a senior defense official said.

–   The additional money for equipment upgrades is on top of the nearly $82 million the Pentagon sought in January to improve its largest conventional bunker-buster bomb, the 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrator.

–   The bomb, officials said, was designed to take out bunkers like those used by Iran to protect its most sensitive nuclear development work.

–   Western intelligence agencies had long suspected that the Iranian navy had between 2,000 and 3,000 mines, largely of Soviet or Chinese origin. But new intelligence suggests Iran may have as many as 5,000, including newer types that may be more powerful and harder to detect.

–   U.S. forces would also need to contend with Iran’s coastal air-defense system, shore-based artillery, Kilo-class and midget submarines, remote-controlled boats and unmanned kamikaze aerial vehicles, according to current and former U.S. officials.

–   The U.S. Navy has 14 minesweepers, three of which are stationed in Bahrain. Mackenzie Eaglen, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, said U.S. minesweeping capabilities have slipped because the military has deferred critical maintenance, a shortcoming it is "working overtime" to address.

—Keith Johnson and Jay Solomon contributed to this article.

Write to Adam Entous at adam.entous@wsj.com and Julian E. Barnes at julian.barnes@wsj.com

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