La Germania deve sollecitare l’agenda europea sul Golfo

<97725079"> Germania Politica estera – Golfo

<97725080"> Khaleej Times 05-03-01

<97725081"/> La Germania deve sollecitare l’agenda europea sul Golfo

Dr. Christian Koch [Christian Koch è direttore del programma del Centro di ricerca per le relazioni tra il Consiglio degli Stati del Golfo e la Ue , di Dubai]

Nel 2004 si sono recati nella regione del Golfo sia il Cancelliere Schcröder, che numerosi funzionari tedeschi, tra cui il ministro degli Esteri Fischer, quello degli Interni Otto Schily e della Difea Peter Struck, un flusso senza precedenti nella politica tedesca.

– La base delle relazioni bilaterali Germania – Stati del Ccg – sembrano continuare ad essere gli interessi commerciali ed economici. Gli Stati del Ccg rappresentano un mercato in forte sviluppo per le esportazioni tedesche, attualmente valutate sopra i €8md., e una opportunità crescente di investimenti. Fanno risaltare questo aspetto delle relazioni il progettato sistema di collegamento con treni a sospensione magnetica tra Bahrain, Qatar, Arabia Saudita, Eau e Oman, i diversi contratti per la difesa sottoscritti in occasione della recente Fiera internazionale per la Difesa di Abu Dhabi, in cui la Germania si è presa i contratti più rilevanti.

– La visita di Schröder evidenzia però l’accresciuto impegno politico tedesco nel Golfo, che darà la principale arena geo-politica per il prossimo decennio.

– La Germania , come grande potenza europea, non può ignorare questa realtà; deve affrontare una serie di questioni strategiche, dalla guerra in Irak al dibattito attuale sul nucleare iraniano.

– La Germania è politicamente impegnata nel Golfo tramite una serie di meccanismi, dalla fornitura di mezzi corazzati al Kuwait durante l’invasione americana dell’Irak, al fatto che fornisce il secondo maggior contingente nelle forze Nato in Afghanistan al programma di addestramento delle forze di sicurezza irachene negli Eau.

– Mentre nel passato la Germania era disposta a subordinare le questioni del Golfo agli Usa o alla Gb, ora non è sicura che l’approccio americano possa dare una stabilità durevole alla regione.

– Teme che se non fa sentire la propria voce, dovrà far fronte assieme all’Europa alle conseguenze del fallimento della politica americana.

– Anziché le prerogative transatlantiche ora sono le divergenze transatlantiche a costringere la Germania a sviluppare un approccio più individuale, il che non significa necessariamente un’aumentata competizione per l’influenza con gli Usa; ciò a cui mira è il fornire una alternativa politica all’attuale unilateralismo americano.

– Occorre incoraggiare questo sviluppo, per gli Stati del Ccg la Germania serve a porre l’enfasi sul multilateralismo tramite Ue e Nato , guardando alla stabilità di lungo periodo, la capacità di tenere aperte le comunicazioni con tutti gli attori regionali, che siano gli Stati del Ccg , o Irak, Iran, Yemen.

– La Germania promuovere il dialogo perché on è gravata in questa regione da un passato coloniale; concorda sulle linee generali riguardo alle principali questioni regionali e internazionali con gli Stati del Ccg , dall’Afghanistan al conflitto arabo-israeliano.

mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-fareast-language: IT; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA”>Questa è un’opportunità unica per la Germania per promuovere un’alternativa europea e sviluppare una comune politica europea. <97725082"> Khaleej Times 05-03-01

<97725083"/> Germany must push Europe’s Gulf agenda

Dr. Christian Koch [Dr Christian Koch is program director, GCC-EU relations, Gulf Research Center, Dubai]

1 March 2005

GERMAN Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s visit to the Gulf this week will be his second in 18 months. In fact, the past year has been characterised by visits to the GCC states from not only the chancellor, but also numerous other German officials, including Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, Interior Minister Otto Schily and Defence Minister Peter Struck.

Such a continuous stream of high-ranking German politicians is quite unprecedented, especially when considering that in the past the Gulf was generally avoided rather than engaged.

On the surface, trade and economic interests continue to form the basis of the bilateral relationship between Germany and the GCC States, with the latter representing a burgeoning market for German exports (currently valued at over 8 billion euros), as well as increased opportunities for investment.

When he arrives, Schroeder will be accompanied by a fairly large business delegation hoping to land lucrative project deals and take advantage of the full financial opportunities that have accrued in the region as a result of the current high oil price environment. The consideration of the trans-rapid magnetic train system to link Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman as well as the numerous defence deals signed during the recent International Defence Exhibition (Idex) in Abu Dhabi — where Germany walked away with the majority of contracts — point toward an emphasis on this aspect of the relationship. The chancellor’s visit, however, also underlines Germany ’s increased political engagement in the Gulf, a role resulting from a number of factors.

As a strong supporter of a common European foreign and security policy, Germany finds itself having to deal with the broader strategic issues that are impacting Europe proper. In light of events such as the Iraq war and after and the current debate about the Iranian nuclear programme, the realisation has taken hold that the Gulf is the main geopolitical arena for the coming decade. Germany, as a main European power, cannot av
oid this reality.

Moreover, Germany ’s increased involvement in the region means that German politicians increasingly have to debate Gulf issues in parliament and explain policies to their voters. Whether in terms of providing protection tanks to Kuwait during the US-led invasion of Iraq, serving as the second largest contingent in the Nato stabilisation force for Afghanistan or the current programme with the UAE to train Iraqi security forces, the fact is that Germany is engaged politically in the Gulf through a variety of mechanisms.

When considering programmes such as the European Union’s Security Strategy in December 2003 or Nato’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative in June 2004, it is clear the commitments will broaden rather than dissipate.

Also on the table is the issue of the US and the current shape of transatlantic relations. Whereas in the past, Germany was completely willing to subordinate Gulf issues to the US or Great Britain as the region’s traditional outside powers, Germany now has significant doubts about whether the current US approach to the region will provide long-lasting stability. The fear is that without a competent voice of its own, Germany — with Europe alongside — will ultimately be left to deal with the consequences of a failed American policy.

Thus, instead of transatlantic prerogatives, it is now transatlantic differences that are forcing Germany to develop a more individual approach. This does not necessarily mean increased competition with the US for influence, but it is aimed at providing a policy alternative to the current US unilateralism.

Overall, this is a development that should be encouraged. As far as the GCC states are concerned, Germany brings to the table exactly what the Gulf requires in its present volatile phase: an emphasis on multilateralism through the EU and Nato, a focus on long-term stability, and an ability to maintain open lines of communications with all of the regional actors, be it the GCC States, Iraq, Iran or Yemen.

Without any colonial past complicating matters, Germany is capable of promoting dialogue, bridging communication gaps and encouraging confidence building, all of which are absolutely essential elements for the foundation of a stable Gulf security architecture in the future. Germany and the GCC states also agree on the broad outlines of the major regional and international issues — from Afghanistan to Iraq to the Arab-Israeli conflict. For Germany , the GCC states are reliable and responsible regional actors and potential partners for increased security operations.

As its involvement in the region grows, Germany is increasingly an indispensable player for other EU partners in the region. Thus, instead of only promoting bilateral interests, Germany should take on the role of a broker between the GCC and the EU to promote a greater degree of convergence and cooperation. All the EU states have a distinct interest in promoting the political and economic integration of the GCC, and their own experience serves as the best example.

Schroeder should use his visit to promote a European agenda and to foster the institutional relations between the GCC and the EU. This is a unique opportunity for Germany to promote a European alternative and develop a common European policy that will help the region begin the process of overcoming mutual reservations.